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Abstract
In this paper we introduce quantum interactive proof systems, which are interactive proof
systems in which the prover and veri-er may perform quantum computations and exchange
quantum messages. It is proved that every language in PSPACE has a quantum interactive proof
system that requires a total of only three messages to be sent between the prover and veri-er and
has exponentially small (one-sided) probability of error. It follows that quantum interactive proof
systems are strictly more powerful than classical interactive proof systems in the constant-round
case unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses to the second level. c© 2002 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Several recent papers have provided compelling evidence, and proof in some cases,
that certain computational, cryptographic, and information-theoretic tasks can be per-
formed more e4ciently by models based on quantum physics than those based on
classical physics. For example, Shor [30] has shown that integers can be factored in
expected polynomial time by quantum computers, a quantum key distribution proto-
col of Bennett and Brassard [10] that does not rely on intractability assumptions has
been proven to be secure [12,25,31], and Raz [27] has shown an exponential separa-
tion between quantum and classical two-party communication complexity models. In
this paper we introduce the quantum analogue of another concept—interactive proof
systems—and provide strong evidence that additional power is gained by interactive
proof systems in the quantum setting.
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Interactive proof systems were -rst introduced by Babai [4] and Goldwasser, Micali,
and RackoK [21]. An interactive proof system consists of an interaction between a
computationally unbounded prover and a computationally bounded probabilistic veri-er.
The prover attempts to convince the veri-er that a given input string satis-es some
property, while the veri-er tries to determine the validity of this “proof”. A language
L is said to have an interactive proof system if there exists a polynomial-time veri-er
V such that (i) there exists a prover P (called an honest prover) that can always
convince V to accept when the given input is in L, and (ii) no prover P′ can convince
V to accept with non-negligible probability when the input is not in L. The class of
languages having interactive proof systems is denoted IP.
Based on the work of Lund et al. [24], Shamir [28] proved that the quanti-ed
boolean formula (QBF) problem, and therefore every language in PSPACE, has an
interactive proof system. Since any language having an interactive proof system is in
PSPACE [19], this implies IP=PSPACE. All known protocols for PSPACE require a
nonconstant number of rounds of communication between the prover and veri-er, and
cannot be parallelized to require only a constant number of rounds under the assumption
that the polynomial time hierarchy is proper. This follows from the fact that the class of
languages having constant-round interactive proof systems is equivalent to AM [4,22],
and hence is contained in p2 .
The main result we prove in this paper is as follows.
Theorem 1. Every language in PSPACE has a three-message quantum interactive
proof system with exponentially small one-sided error.
This result contrasts with the facts mentioned above regarding classical interactive
proof systems, as it shows there are languages having constant-round quantum inter-
active proof systems that do not have constant-round classical interactive proof systems
unless AM=PSPACE.
Subsequent to the publication of the preliminary version of the present paper, Kitaev
and Watrous [23] have proved a stronger result than Theorem 1, which is that any
polynomial-round quantum interactive proof system can be parallelized to just three
messages. The reader interested in the more general result should therefore refer to
that paper. However, the techniques used by Kitaev and Watrous and in the present
paper diKer considerably, and we believe that both techniques will potentially -nd other
applications.
We now summarize informally our technique for proving Theorem 1, which is essen-
tially to show that we may parallelize a classical interactive proof system for the QBF
problem by allowing the prover and veri-er to send and process quantum information.
Consider the following unsuccessful method for trying to reduce the number of
rounds required by a nonconstant-round protocol for PSPACE to a single round: de-ne
the veri-er so that it -rst generates all of its random numbers, sends them all to the
prover in one message, receives all the responses from the prover, and checks the
validity of the interaction. This will clearly not work, since the prover may cheat by
“looking ahead” and basing its responses on random numbers that would have been sent
in later rounds in the nonconstant-round case—the fact that the prover must commit
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to certain answers before seeing the veri-er’s subsequent messages is essential for the
soundness of existing protocols. However, using interactive proofs based on quantum
physics, this technique can be made to work, as the abovementioned behavior on the
part of the prover can be detected by a quantum veri-er. We now sketch the method
for doing this—a formal description of the protocol appears in Section 3.
Suppose Vc is a classical veri-er and Pc is a classical prover for QBF. It is assumed
that Vc is nonadaptive in the sense that each of its messages is simply a sequence of
coin-Qips that is independent of the prover’s messages. We will let V and P denote
the quantum veri-er and prover in the resulting three-message quantum protocol. The
quantum prover P -rst generates a superposition over all possible conversations between
Vc and Pc. The prover P sends this state to the veri-er V , but for technical reasons
the prover will keep a copy of the messages corresponding to Vc for himself. At this
point V and P share an entangled quantum state between them. It will be shown that P
cannot cheat by preparing a state that is biased towards certain random choices for Vc,
since the veri-er V will be able to later check that the state was close to uniform. The
veri-er V checks that the conversations sent by P are valid according to the classical
protocol for QBF by performing a suitable measurement. Naturally V rejects in case
it sees a conversation that is not valid.
The veri-er V now needs to check that the quantum state sent by P really cor-
responded to some classical prover Pc. Such a prover Pc would necessarily -x its
response to each message of Vc before seeing messages that would be sent in later
rounds. The veri-er V does this by randomly choosing some round in the classical
protocol and challenging the prover P to demonstrate that there is no correlation be-
tween the veri-er-messages after the chosen round and the prover-messages before and
including the chosen round. Let us say that the prover- and veri-er-messages before
and including the chosen round have low-index, and the remaining messages in the
conversation have high-index. Thus, the low-index prover-messages should not have
any correlation with the high-index veri-er-messages. The challenge is as follows:
V sends back to P all of the high-index prover-messages but keeps the low-index
prover-messages and all of the veri-er-messages, allows P to reverse its computa-
tion of the high-index prover-messages, and also allows P to send back its copy of
all of the veri-er-messages. The veri-er now checks that the superposition of high-
index veri-er-messages is uniform by performing an appropriately de-ned measure-
ment. If there is signi-cant correlation between the low-index prover responses and the
high-index veri-er-messages, the uniformity test will fail with high probability and V
will reject.
By performing the above process in parallel a polynomial number of times, the
probability a cheating prover escapes detection is made exponentially small, while the
protocol still requires only three messages to be communicated. We prove that the
prover cannot cheat by entangling parallel executions of the protocol.
It is interesting to note that whereas any constant-message interactive proof system
can be parallelized to just two messages in the classical case, it is apparently not
straightforward to apply similar techniques in the quantum case—we have not been
able to reduce our three-message quantum protocol to require only two messages, and
it is an interesting open question whether this is possible in general.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal
de-nition of quantum interactive proof systems based on the quantum circuit model.
In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1 by presenting a three-message quantum interactive
proof system for the quanti-ed boolean formula problem and proving its correctness.
We conclude with Section 4, which mentions some open problems.
2. Denitions
We now give a formal de-nition of quantum interactive proof systems. We re-
strict our attention to constant-round quantum interactive proof systems, although the
de-nition is easily extended to a nonconstant number of rounds. See Kitaev and
Watrous [23] for further details. The model for quantum computation that provides
a basis for our de-nition is the quantum circuit model. We will not de-ne quantum
circuits or discuss them in detail, as this has been done elsewhere (see Yao [33],
Berthiaume [11], and Nielsen and Chuang [26] for example).
An m-message veri-er V is a polynomial-time computable mapping V : ∗×{1; : : : ; k}
→∗ for k = m=2+1, where each V (x; j) is an encoding of a quantum circuit com-
posed of quantum gates from some appropriately chosen universal set of gates. Univer-
sal sets of gates=transformations have been investigated in several papers [1,7,8,15,16];
for the purposes of this paper, we will assume only that this set includes the Hadamard
gate and any gate or collection of gates universal for reversible computation, such as
the Fredkin gate or ToKoli gate. Each encoding V (x; j) is identi-ed with the quantum
circuit it encodes. It is assumed that this encoding is such that the size of a circuit
is polynomial in the length of its encoding, so that each circuit V (x; j) is polyno-
mial in size. The qubits upon which each V (x; j) acts are divided into two groups:
message qubits and ancilla qubits. The message qubits represent the communication
channel between the prover and veri-er, while the ancilla qubits represent qubits that
are private to the veri-er. One of the veri-er’s ancilla qubits is speci-ed as the output
qubit.
An m-message prover P is a mapping from ∗×{1; : : : ; k ′} to the set of all quantum
circuits, where k ′= m=2 + 12. No restrictions are placed on the size of each P(x; j)
or on the gates from which these circuits are composed. Similar to the case of the
veri-er, the qubits of the prover are divided into message qubits and ancilla qubits.
Note that although the prover is all-powerful in a computational sense, since there is
no bound on the complexity of the mapping P or on the size of each P(x; j), we of
course require that the prover obeys the laws of physics! This is enforced by requiring
that the prover’s actions correspond to valid quantum circuits.
Given a prover=veri-er pair (P; V ), consider a quantum circuit composed as shown
in Fig. 1 (the case m=4 is shown). The probability that a pair (P; V ) accepts a given
input x is de-ned to be the probability that an observation of the output qubit in the
{|0〉; |1〉} basis yields |1〉 when the circuits V (x; 1); P(x; 1); V (x; 2); : : : ; P(x; k ′); V (x; k)
in case m is even, or P(x; 1); V (x; 1); : : : ; P(x; k ′); V (x; k) in case m is odd, are applied
in sequence as illustrated, assuming all qubits are initially in the |0〉 state.
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Fig. 1. Quantum circuit for a 4-message quantum interactive proof system.
Now, we say that a language L has an m-message quantum interactive proof system
with error probability  if there exists an m-message veri-er V such that
1. There exists an m-message prover P such that if x∈L then (P; V ) accepts x with
probability 1.
2. For all m-message provers P′, if x =∈L then (P′; V ) accepts x with probability at
most .
A few notes regarding the above de-nition are in order. First, we note that there
are other ways in which we could have de-ned quantum interactive proof systems,
such as a de-nition based on quantum Turing machines or a de-nition requiring that
each circuit as above be given by V (|x|; i) or P(|x|; i), with x supplied as input to
each circuit. We have chosen the above de-nition because of its simplicity. Given the
apparent robustness of the class of polynomial-time computable quantum transforma-
tions, we suspect these de-nitions to be equivalent, although we have not investigated
this question in detail. Second, we assume that each circuit corresponds to a unitary
operator (e.g., no “measurement gates” are used). The action of any general quantum
gate (i.e., a gate corresponding to a trace-preserving, completely positive linear map
on mixed states of qubits) can always be simulated by some unitary gate, possibly
adding more ancilla qubits [2]. As this will not increase the size of a veri-er’s circuit
by more than a polynomial factor, and will not aKect the complexity of the mapping V
signi-cantly, our de-nition is equivalent to a de-nition allowing more general quantum
gates.
3. Three-message quantum interactive proof systems for QBF
Recall that a quanti-ed boolean formula is a formula of the form Q1x1 · · ·Qnxn (x1;
: : : ; xn), where each Qi is an existential or universal quanti-er (∃ or ∀) and  (x1; : : : ; xn)
is a boolean formula without quanti-ers in the variables x1; : : : ; xn. The quanti-ed
boolean formula (QBF) problem is to determine if a given quanti-ed boolean for-
mula is true.
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To prove Theorem 1, it is su4cient to prove that there exists a three-message quan-
tum interactive proof system with exponentially small error for the QBF problem. This
is because the veri-er may -rst compute a polynomial-time reduction from a given
problem in PSPACE to the QBF problem, then execute the protocol for QBF, adjust-
ing various parameters in the protocol to reduce error as necessary.
3.1. Classical QBF protocol
Our three-message quantum interactive proof system for the QBF problem is based
on a variant of the Lund–Fortnow–KarloK–Nisan protocol due to Shen [29], to which
the reader is referred for a detailed description. In this section we review some facts
regarding this protocol that will later be helpful.
Let =Q1x1 · · ·Qnxn (x1; : : : ; xn) be a -xed input formula. Also let F be a -nite
-eld, whose size will be chosen later, and let N =( n+12 )+n. The protocol is as follows.
For j=1; : : : ; N − 1, the prover sends the veri-er a polynomial pj over F of degree at
most d (which is determined by the protocol and may be taken to be polynomial in
n), and the veri-er chooses rj ∈ F and sends rj to the prover. The prover then sends a
polynomial pN to the veri-er in the -nal round, and the veri-er chooses rN ∈ F. The
veri-er then evaluates a particular polynomial-time predicate E(; r1; : : : ; rN ; p1; : : : ; pN )
and accepts if and only if the predicate evaluates to true.
A formal description of E may be derived from the paper of Shen. Since the details
of the predicate are not necessary for our discussion, we will only state certain prop-
erties of E. First, for any sequence of random -eld elements r1; : : : ; rN ∈ F there exist
polynomials q1; : : : ; qN , where each polynomial qj depends only on r1; : : : ; rj−1, that
correspond to the answers that should be given by an honest prover. These polynomi-
als, which are well-de-ned regardless of the boolean value of , satisfy the following
properties:
1. If  is true, then E(; r1; : : : ; rN ; q1; : : : ; qN ) is true.
2. If  is false, then for all r1; : : : ; rN and p2; : : : ; pN , E(; r1; : : : ; rN ; q1; p2; : : : ; pN ) is
false.
3. If  is false, then for all k6N −1, r1; : : : ; rk−1, and p1; : : : ; pk , the following holds
in case pk = qk : there are at most d values of rk for which there exist rk+1; : : : ; rN
and pk+2; : : : ; pN such that E(; r1; : : : ; rN ; p1; : : : ; pk ; qk+1; pk+2; : : : ; pN ) is true.
4. If  is false, then for any r1; : : : ; rN−1 and polynomials p1; : : : ; pN such that pN = qN ,
there are at most d values of rN for which E(; r1; : : : ; rN ; p1; : : : ; pN ) is true.
For given r1; : : : ; rk−1, we call the polynomial qk the correct polynomial corresponding
to r1; : : : ; rk−1.
Clearly, if  evaluates to true, an honest prover can always convince the veri-er
to accept by sending the correct polynomials q1; : : : ; qN corresponding to the veri-ers
random numbers r1; : : : ; rN−1.
Now suppose that  evaluates to false. By item 2, a cheating prover cannot send
the correct polynomial q1 on the -rst round, for the prover rejects with certainty in
this case. Hence the prover must send p1 = q1 if the veri-er is to accept. Now suppose
for 16k6N − 1 and r1; : : : ; rk−1 the prover has sent polynomials p1 = q1; : : : ; pk = qk
during rounds 1; : : : ; k. Unless the veri-er randomly chooses one of d particular values
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for rk , the prover may not send qk+1 on the next round without causing the veri-er
to reject. Hence, if the prover sends an incorrect polynomial on round k, then with
probability at least 1 − d=|F| it must send an incorrect polynomial on round k + 1.
Finally, if the prover does not send the correct polynomial qN during the last round,
the veri-er accepts with probability at most d=|F|. Hence, the total probability that the
veri-er accepts may not exceed (dN )=|F|.
Since the error probability of the protocol depends on the size of F; F may be chosen
su4ciently large at the start of the protocol. It will be convenient for us to take F to be
the -eld with 2k elements for k polynomial in n, which yields an exponentially small
probability of error. For any chosen k, the veri-er and prover may use a deterministic
procedure to implement arithmetic in F in the following common way: an irreducible
polynomial g of degree k over GF(2) is computed in deterministic polynomial time
[32], elements of F are identi-ed with polynomials over GF(2) of degree at most k−1,
and arithmetic is taken to be the usual arithmetic on polynomials modulo g. This yields
a natural correspondence between k bit strings and elements of F.
3.2. Quantum veri7er’s protocol and proof of completeness
We now describe the three-message quantum veri-er’s protocol for QBF along with
the protocol for the honest prover. It will be straightforward to demonstrate that this
gives a complete proof system—the soundness of the proof system is proved in the
next subsection.
We use the following conventions when describing the protocol. Collections of qubits
upon which various transformations are performed are referred to as registers, and are
labeled by capital letters in boldface. The registers required by the protocol are Ri; j, Si; j,
and Pi; j for 16i6m and 16j6N , where N is as in the classical protocol described
in Section 3.1 and m is some polynomial in the input size, chosen depending on the
desired error bound as described later. Each register Ri; j and Si; j consists of k qubits,
where 2k is to be the size of the -eld F. We view the classical states of these registers
as elements in F, and identify these registers with the random -eld elements chosen
by the veri-er in the classical protocol. As for m we will later choose k to be some
polynomial in order to obtain our desired error bound. Each Pi; j consists of d + 1
collections of k qubits, for d as in the classical protocol, and we view the classical
states of these registers as polynomials of degree at most d with coe4cients in F.
These registers are identi-ed with the polynomials sent by the prover to the veri-er in
the classical protocol.
The veri-er may also use any polynomial number of additional ancilla qubits in or-
der to perform the transformations described, and will also store various auxiliary
variables, such as the random vector u described below, needed for the protocol.
As there will be no need for the veri-er to perform quantum operations on these
values, we consider them as being stored classically. There is no diKerence in the
behavior of the protocol if they are thought of as being stored in quantum registers,
however.
It will be convenient to refer to certain collections of the quantum registers mentioned
above; for a given vector u∈{1; : : : ; N}m we let Ru be the collection of registers
582 J. Watrous / Theoretical Computer Science 292 (2003) 575–588
Fig. 2. Example division of R and P for N=8; m=5, and u= (6; 4; 7; 2; 5).
Ri;1; : : : ;Ri; ui−1 for i=1; : : : ; m, and we let P
u be the collection of registers Pi;1; : : : ;Pi; ui
for i=1; : : : ; m. See Fig. 2 for an example. We also let Ri and Pi denote the vectors
(Ri;1; : : : ;Ri; N ) and (Pi;1; : : : ;Pi; N ), respectively.
Aside from reversible computations that may be described classically, the only quan-
tum transformation used by the veri-er is the Hadamard transform H that acts on a
single qubit and is de-ned by H : |0〉 → (|0〉+ |1〉)=√2 and H : |1〉 → (|0〉 − |1〉)=√2 as
usual.
We now describe the actions of the veri-er and honest prover. When describing the
actions of the honest prover and states of the entire system, it is assumed that the input
QBF  is true.
Step 1 (prover). Given a QBF  and an m×N matrix R of elements in F, let
Q(R) denote the corresponding matrix of correct polynomials as de-ned in Section
3.1. For each i; Q(R)i;1; : : : ; Q(R)i; N is thus the sequence of polynomials the honest
prover returns in the classical protocol given random -eld elements Ri;1; : : : ; Ri;N . The
honest (quantum) prover prepares superposition
2−kmN=2
∑
R
|R〉|R〉|Q(R)〉
in registers R; S, and P, sends R and P to the veri-er, and keeps the register S. The
state of the system is now
2−kmN=2
∑
R
{|R〉|Q(R)〉}veri-er{|R〉}prover :
Step 1 (veri-er). The veri-er rejects if (Ri ;Pi) contain an invalid proof that the
input formula  evaluates to true for any i∈{1; : : : ; m} with respect to the classical
protocol described in Section 3.1. This check is performed by reversibly computing the
predicate E, so as not to alter superpositions of valid pairs (R; P). In the case that 
is true and the prover is honest the veri-er never rejects on this step. The veri-er now
chooses u∈{1; : : : ; N}m uniformly at random and sends u and VPu to the prover. The
state of the system is now
2−kmN=2
∑
R
{|R〉|Q(R)u〉}veri-er{|R〉|Q(R)u〉}prover :
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Step 2 (prover). Let Ti; j be a unitary transformation such that Ti; j : |R〉|0〉 →
|R〉|Q(R)i; j〉 for each i; j. Upon receiving u and VPu, the honest prover applies transfor-
mation T−1i; j to S together with Pi; j for each pair i; j. This returns each register of VP
u
to its initial zero value. The prover then sends S to the veri-er. At this point the state
of the system is
2−kmN=2
∑
R
{|R〉|R〉|Q(R)u〉}veri-er{|0〉}prover :
Here, the state |0〉 for the prover means that each register of VPu contains 0, and so the
prover has completely disentangled itself from the veri-er’s registers.
Step 2 (veri-er). The veri-er subtracts Ri; j from Si; j for each i; j. In the case of
the honest prover this has the eKect of simply erasing S. Next, the veri-er applies
the Hadamard transform to every qubit in each register of VRu. If VRu now contains
only 0 values, the veri-er accepts, otherwise the veri-er rejects. In short, the veri-er
is projecting the state of VRu onto the state where VRu is uniformly distributed over all
possible values. It is easy to check that in the case of the honest prover the registers
VRu are not entangled with any other registers, as each register of Pu depends only on
those of Ru, and are in a uniform superposition over all possible values. Thus, the
veri-er accepts with certainty in this case.
This completes the description of the protocol and the proof of completeness.
3.3. Proof of soundness
Now we show that the veri-er accepts with exponentially small probability in case
 is false, given any prover. Recall that the veri-er acts as follows.
Step 1 (veri-er). Receive quantum registers R and P from the prover. Reject if
(Ri ;Pi) contain an invalid proof that the input formula  evaluates to true for any
i∈{1; : : : ; m}. Choose u∈{1; : : : ; N}m uniformly at random and send u and VPu to the
prover.
Step 2 (veri-er). Receive S from the prover and subtract Ri; j from Si; j for each i; j.
Apply a Hadamard transform to every qubit in each register of VRu and observe. If VRu
now contains only 0 values then accept, otherwise reject.
Let us examine the state of the prover and veri-er as the protocol is executed. The
prover -rst sends registers R and P to the veri-er. The state of the system at this point
may be expressed as∑
R;P
 (R; P)|R〉|P〉|!(R; P)〉; (1)
where each  (R; P) is a complex number and |!(R; P)〉 is a normalized vector repre-
senting the state of the prover’s ancilla registers, which may be entangled with R and
P in any manner the prover chooses. Since the veri-er rejects any pair R; P for which
each (Ri; Pi) is not a valid proof that  is true, we may assume the state in Eq. (1) is
a superposition over such valid pairs for the purposes of bounding the probability that
the veri-er accepts.
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The veri-er chooses u randomly and sends u and VPu to the prover. The prover
applies some transformation to its registers (now including VPu), sends some register
S to the veri-er, and the veri-er subtracts the contents of R from S. The state of the
system may now be described by∑
R;Pu
"(R; u; Pu)|R〉|Pu〉|#(R; u; Pu)〉; (2)
where each "(R; u; Pu) is some complex number and |#(R; u; Pu)〉 is a normalized vector
describing the state of the prover’s registers as well as register S.
The veri-er now performs the Hadamard transforms on VRu and observes, rejecting
if any bit is not set to 0 and accepting otherwise. In order to calculate the resulting
probability of acceptance, let us for now assume that u is -xed. Denote by H⊗k the
unitary transformation on k qubits obtained by applying the Hadamard transform to
each qubit individually. Let l=
∑m
i=1 (N − ui + 1), so that l denotes the number of
registers (i.e., -eld elements) in VRu. Now, we have that the probability of acceptance
is ∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑R;Pu "(R; u; Pu)|Ru〉〈0|H⊗k |R1;u1〉〈0|H⊗k |R1;u1+1〉 · · ·
〈0|H⊗k |Rm;um |Pu〉|#(R; u; Pu)〉
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
:
Noting that 〈0|H⊗k |x〉=2−k=2 for every x∈ F, this simpli-es to
2−lk
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑R;Pu "(R; u; Pu)|Ru〉|Pu〉|#(R; u; Pu)〉
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= 2−lk
∑
Ru; Pu
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑VRu "(R; u; Pu)|#(R; u; Pu)〉
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
:
By the triangle inequality, this probability is at most
2−lk
∑
Ru; Pu
(∑
VRu
|"(R; u; Pu)|
)2
: (3)
It remains to prove an upper bound on the probability in Eq. (3) given that u is
chosen uniformly at random. In order to do this, let us associate with each register
Ri; j and each register Pi; j a random variable. The probability with which each random
variable takes a particular value is precisely the probability that an observation of the
associated register yields the given value, assuming that the observation takes place
while the entire system is in the state described in Eq. (1). As we have done for
registers, we may consider collections of random variables as being single random
variables, abbreviated by Ru; Pu, etc.
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Now, note that
|"(R; u; Pu)|2 = Pr[R = R; Pu = Pu]
for each R and Pu. This follows from the fact that the registers in R and Pu are never
touched between the points in the protocol corresponding to the states in Eqs. (1) and
(2). Therefore we may rewrite the probability in Eq. (3) as
2−lk
∑
Ru; Pu
(∑
VRu
√
Pr[R = R;Pu = Pu]
)2
: (4)
To bound this expression, it will be helpful to consider the following de-nition.
Denition 1. For any -nite set S and mapping f : S→[0; 1], de-ne
'S(f) =
∑
s∈S
√
f(s):
Now, for each pair Ru; Pu, de-ne XRu;Pu : Fl→ [0; 1] as follows:
XRu;Pu( VRu) = Pr[ VRu = VRu|Ru = Ru;Pu = Pu]:
The probability in Eq. (4) may be written as
2−lk
∑
Ru; Pu
Pr[Ru = Ru;Pu = Pu]('Fl(XRu; Pu))
2:
We next de-ne certain events based on the above random variables. Recall the
de-nition of Q(R) from above (i.e., Q(R) is the m×N matrix of correct polynomials
an honest prover answers for given R). For 16i6m, 16j6N −1, and R denoting the
contents of R, de-ne Ai; j to be the event that Pi; j′ does not contain Q(R)i; j′ for j′6j
but Pi; j+1 does contain Q(R)i; j+1. Informally, the event Ai; j means that the prover has
tried to “sneak in” a correct polynomial in register Pi; j+1. Also, for 16i6m, de-ne
Ai;N to be the event that Pi; j′ does not contain Q(R)i; j′ for every j′. This event means
that the prover never tries to put a correct polynomial in registers Pi;1; : : : ;Pi; N . Note
that we must have Pr[Ai;1 ∪ · · · ∪Ai;N ] = 1 for each i, as the veri-er rejects in step 1
if Pi;1 contains Q(R)i;1. Finally, de-ne the event Bu as Bu =
⋃
i Ai; ui . The event Bu,
which we will later show is very likely to occur when u is chosen uniformly, means
that the veri-er has chosen some u that catches at least one of the locations where the
prover is cheating, i.e., trying to “sneak in” correct polynomials. Now de-ne mappings
YRu;Pu : Fl→ [0; 1] and ZRu;Pu : Fl→ [0; 1] as follows:
YRu; Pu( VRu) = Pr[ VRu = VRu|Ru = Ru;Pu = Pu; Bu];
ZRu; Pu( VRu) = Pr[ VRu = VRu|Ru = Ru;Pu = Pu;¬Bu];
for events Bu and ¬Bu. We have
'Fl(XRu; Pu) = 'Fl(.u YRu; Pu + (1− .u)ZRu; Pu)
for .u =Pr[Bu|Ru =Ru;Pu =Pu].
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Now consider the number of values of VRu for which YRu;Pu( VRu)= 0; we claim that
this number is at least (1−dm2−k) 2kl for every Ru; Pu. This may be argued as follows.
First, -x values for Ru; Pu, and i, and assume event Ai; ui takes place. By the properties
of the classical protocol discussed in Section 3.1, there are at most d values of Ri; ui
that do not cause the classical protocol to reject in this case. Thus, the number of
values of VRu for which we have
Pr[ VRu = VRu|Ru = Ru; Pu = Pu; Ai; ui ] = 0
is at most d2k(l−1). Since
m∑
i=1
Pr[ VRu = VRu|Ru = Ru; Pu = Pu; Ai; ui ]¿ YRu;Pu( VRu)¿ 0;
the total number of values of VRu for which we have YRu;Pu( VRu) =0 is at most dm2k(l−1).
Next, let us bound Pr[Bu] assuming u is chosen uniformly from {1; : : : ; N}m. We
have
Pr[Bu] =
∑
P
Pr[Bu|P = P] Pr[P = P]
= 1−
(
1− 1
N
)m
¿ 1− e−m=N :
At this point, a simple lemma is required.
Lemma 1. Let f; g : S→ [0; 1] satisfy ∑s∈S f(s)61 and ∑s∈S g(s)61, let .∈ [0; 1],
and let r= |{s∈ S|f(s)= 0}|. Then 'S(.f + (1− .)g)6
√
(1− .)r +√|S| − r.
Proof. First note that for any function h : S→ [0; 1] such that ∑s∈S h(s)61, we have
'S(h)6
√|S| by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. De-ne T = {s∈ S|f(s)= 0}.
We have
'S(.f + (1− .)g) =
√
1− . 'T (g) + 'S\T (.f(s) + (1− .)g(s))
6
√
(1− .)|T |+
√
|S\T |
=
√
(1− .)r +
√
|S| − r
as claimed.
We apply Lemma 1 to obtain
2−lk('Fl(XRu;Pu))
26 2−lk(
√
(1− .u)(2lk − dm2k(l−1)) +
√
dm2k(l−1))2
6 1− Pr[Bu|Ru = Ru;Pu = Pu](1− dm2−k) + 2
√
dm2−k :
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Hence, the probability that the veri-er accepts is at most
2−lk
∑
Ru;Pu
Pr [Ru = Ru;Pu = Pu]('Fl(XRu;Pu))
2
6 1− (1− e−m=N ) (1− dm2−k) + 2
√
dm2−k :
By initially choosing m and k to be su4ciently fast growing polynomials in n (e.g.,
m=(n + 1)N and k =2n + dm + 6), this probability may be made smaller than 2−n,
which completes the proof.
4. Conclusions and open problems
We have de-ned in this paper a natural quantum analogue of the notion of an
interactive proof system, and proved that there exist three-message quantum interactive
proof systems with exponentially small error for any PSPACE language.
Currently the best upper bound known on the power of quantum interactive proof
systems is that any language having a quantum interactive proof system is in EXP [23].
We do not know if EXP has constant-round quantum interactive proofs, if quantum
interactive proofs characterize PSPACE, or if the class of languages having quantum
interactive proofs lies strictly between PSPACE and EXP. Another interesting class is
the class of languages having two-message quantum interactive proof systems. How
does this class relate to PSPACE, for instance?
Several variants on interactive proof systems have been studied, such as multi-prover
interactive proofs [5,9,13,18,20], probabilistically checkable proofs [3,20], and interac-
tive proof systems having veri-ers with very limited computing power [14,17]. How
do quantum analogues of these models compare with their classical counterparts?
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